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Abstract
This paper investigates whether high regional crime levels lead to a compensating
wage diﬀerential paid by ﬁrms in the respective region. Using data from German social
security records and oﬃcial police statistics for 2003 to 2006, we consider both violent
and non-violent crimes and use three-way error-components estimators to control for
individual and regional heterogeneity. Our ﬁndings suggest a positive and rather large
compensating diﬀerential for the risk of falling victim to a violent crime while no such
eﬀect exists for other criminal activities. However, our results also suggest that the
wage eﬀects for most individuals are rather small due to small variation in the crime
rates.
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1 Introduction
The idea that workers are monetarily compensated for non-pleasant or dangerous aspects
of their respective job, that is the idea that there are compensating wage diﬀerentials,
can be traced back to Book I of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (see Rosen 1986 for
an overview on the general subject). In this paper, we investigate whether workers that
have to work in regions that are characterized by a high crime rate, are compensated for
the higher risk of being hurt or robbed. The idea that regional diﬀerences in quality of
∗Empirical Economics, Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lueneburg, braak-
mann@uni.leuphana.de, Tel.: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2303, Fax: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2026
The author would like to thank Joachim Wagner for helpful hints and overall support and Thomas
Cornelissen for help with the felsdvreg-program. All calculations were performed using Stata 10.0 SE
(StataCorp 2007). All do-ﬁles are available from the author on request. The data used in this paper can be
accessed via the research data center of the Federal Employment Agency in the Institute of Employment
Research in Nuremberg. See http://fdz.iab.de for details.
1live, including crime rates, may give rise to compensating wage diﬀerentials is again not
new (see e.g. Roback 1982, 1988) and has actually made it into at least one introductory
textbook (Hall and Liebermann 2001, p. 346). Additionally, the idea that workers may
demand compensation for having to live in high-crime areas has intuitive appeal: While
compensating wage diﬀerentials are sometimes hard to evaluate as preferences for job
conditions obviously diﬀer between workers, it is diﬃcult to imagine individuals with a
preference for being robbed or beaten up on the street.
Furthermore, some studies found a relationship between local crime rates and labor
market behavior or outcomes. For the most part, these belong to a literature focusing on
the role local living conditions or amenities play for both rents and wages (see e.g. Roback
1982 for an early example). Roback (1982, 1988) ﬁnds evidence for a positive impact of
crime on wages using cross-sectional data for individuals residing in the 98 largest U.S.
cities. Using data from the 1976 wave of the Panel Study in Income Dynamics, Gerking
and Neirick (1983) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the overall crime rate in a region
and real wages. Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1983) using micro-data from the 1980 U.S.
census again ﬁnd a positive relationship between crime rates and wages. Schmidt and
Courant (2006) using 1995 Current Population Survey data and focusing on a diﬀerent
question ﬁnd a positive, though insigniﬁcant eﬀect of crime on log wages in one of their
speciﬁcations. The only study relying on longitudinal data (Smith 2005) uses the Mariel
boatlift and a subsequent increase in crime rates in Miami as a natural experiment.1 Her
results indicate a large wage diﬀerential as high as 25% in favor of high-crime risk workers
in Miami compared to similar workers in Houston or Los Angeles. Finally, in a study
focusing on the timing of work, Hamermesh (1999) ﬁnds evidence that high crime rates
reduce the propensitiy to work in the evening and during the night using data from the
Current Population Surveys for 1973, 1978, 1985 and 1991.
Additionally, there has been a rather large body of research on the relationship between
local living conditions, e.g. the existence of amenities and disamenities, and house prices
(see Gibbons and Machin 2008 for a recent review on the empirical literature). Of these,
three papers have recently been concerned with local crime rates: Bowes and Ihlanfeld
(2001) use data from Atlanta for the years 1991-1994 in cross-sectional regressions with
1Readers familiar with Brian De Palma’s movies might recognize this as the background for the story
in Scarface.
2a number of control variables. Their results indicate a 3 to 5.7% increase in housing
prices for one additional crime per acre. Using a similar estimation strategy on data from
Jacksonville, Florida, Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) ﬁnd a 4% decreasse in housing prices
for a one standard deviation increase in violent crimes and a non-signiﬁcant increase in
prices for higher levels of property crime. Finally, in the only study for Europe, Gibbons
(2004) uses data for London in 1999/2000. Using a semi-parametric modelling strategy to
eliminate unobservable spatial factors and instrumental variables, speciﬁcally proximity to
bars and crime in non-residential dwellings, he ﬁnds a 10% decrease in housing prices for
a one standard deviation increase in criminal damages to property and a non-signiﬁcant
relationship with burglary.
To the best of my knowledge, all previous research on the relationship between crime
rates and labor market outcomes has focused on the U.S., for the most part using cross-
sectional data. Additionally, there has been no research on the question whether wages are
inﬂuenced diﬀerently by high rates of violent and non-violent crimes. This paper adds to
the literature by providing ﬁrst evidence from European labor markets, using measures for
several types of criminal activities. Additionally, we make a methodological contribution
by using for the ﬁrst time three-way error-component estimators that have recently been
used in labor economic research – starting with Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) –
to control for individual, time and county speciﬁc heterogeneity.
In a ﬁrst step, we merge individual data from social security records with crime data
from the Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik provided by the German Federal Criminal Police
Oﬃce (Bundeskriminalamt) for the years 2003 to 2006. In a second step, we estimate
wage functions for men and women using measures for various types of violent and non-
violent criminal activities while controlling for occupations and other individual and ﬁrm
characteristics, as well as for both individual and county unobserved heterogeneity. Our
results show non-negligible increases in wages for increases in the risk of falling victim to
a violent crime while no such eﬀect exists for other types of criminal activities. However,
the wage eﬀects associated with typical variation in the crime rates observed in the data
are rather small, suggesting that the inﬂuence of crime on wages is for most individuals
negligible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 describes the data, while section
33 describes the estimator and the identiﬁcation strategy employed. Estimation results are
presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this study comes from the so called employment panel of the Federal
Employment Agency (BA- Beschäftigtenpanel). Speciﬁc information on an earlier version
of the employment panel can be found in Koch and Meinken (2004), the current version is
described (in German) in Schmucker and Seth (2006).
The individual data originates from social security information and is collected in the
so called employee history by the Federal Employment Agency.2 In Germany, employers
are obliged by German law to deliver annual information on their employees, as well as
additional information at the beginning and end of an employment, to social security.
These notiﬁcations are used to calculate pensions, as well as contributions to and beneﬁts
from health and unemployment insurance. The resulting spell data covers approximately
75 - 80% of the German workforce, excluding free-lancers, the self-employed, civil servants
and family workers (Koch and Meinken 2004, p. 317). It contains information on the begin
and end of employment, daily wages, a person’s age and sex, as well as several variables
collected for statistical purposes, e.g. education or nationality.
From these ﬁles the employment panel is drawn in a two step procedure. First, all
persons born on one of seven speciﬁed dates are selected. As the German social security
number is tied to the date of birth and does not change over time, it is possible to track those
persons over time. Additionally, entries in and exits from the labor force are automatically
covered by this procedure as new entrants born on one of these dates replace persons leaving
the labor force. In a second step, the panel is formed by drawing four cross-sections per
year – on the last day of March, June, September and December respectively – from this
data. Finally, if a person receives unemployment beneﬁts or is in an active labor market
program on one of those days, an artiﬁcial observation indicating this fact is generated from
other data sources of the Federal Employment Agency. The resulting panel is unbalanced
2More information on person-level data from German social security records can be found in Bender at
al. (2000).
4due to entries into and exits from the labor force. However, there is no missing information
due to non-response.
The person level data is combined with ﬁrm information that is formed by aggregating
social security data on the plant level. The plant data provide information on the structure
of the respective workforce regarding education, age and occupational position, the plant-
size and the industry aﬃliation of the respective plant. Regional information is available
on the county (Kreis) level for both the indiviual’s place of living and the location of the
employer.
The crime data comes from oﬃcial crime statistics, the Polizeiliche Kirminalstatistik,
collected by the Criminal Police Oﬃces of the Länder (the Landeskriminalämter) and
provided by the Federal Criminal Police Oﬃce (Bundeskriminalamt). This information is
available on the county level for the years 2003 to 2006 for a variety of crimes, more specif-
ically general crime, assaults, housebreaking, theft of/from cars and damages to property.
For the analysis, housebreaking, theft and damages to property are considered jointly as
“property crimes”. Crime rates are deﬁnes as reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
To arrive at the estimation sample, we ﬁrst drop persons younger than 25 and older
than 55 to avoid problems with ongoing education and early retirement. Additionally, as
the education variable in this data is known to be problematic due to reporting errors,
restricting the sample to those age groups allows us to treat education as ﬁxed. Further-
more, we restrict the sample to regular, full time workers, dropping trainees, home and
part-time workers. Finally, we drop the top/bottom 1% of the wage distribution to con-
trol for outliers and split the sample by gender, which leads to 782,279 observations from
241,715 individuals for the male sample and 463,603 observations from 147,962 individuals
for the female sample. Descriptive statistics for both samples can be found in tables 1 and
2.
(Tables 1 and 2 about here.)
3 Econometric modeling
Consider the following model of the data generating process which is similar to the three-
way error-component model employed in the literature on worker/ﬁrm matches starting
5with Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999):
yijt = xitβ + cijt ∗ τ + αi + φj + µt + it (1)
where yijt is the (log) wage of worker i in year t in county j, xit contains time variant
personal and ﬁrm characteristics of the speciﬁc worker or worker ﬁrm match, cijt is the
crime rate worker i living or working in county j faces at time t, and αi, φj and µt are
individual, county and time ﬁxed eﬀects respectively.3 Interest in this paper lies on the
estimation of τ which gives the eﬀect of regional crime rates on wages. Positive values for
τ imply the existence of a compensating wage diﬀerential. The model is estimated twice
using repsectively the place of living and the place of work for the regional information.
As control variables we include three digit occupations, age (including a squared term),
plantsize, three digit industries, the age structure of the current employer’s workforce
measured by the shares of workers in ﬁve year age intervals, the educational structure of
the employer’s workforce by the shares of workers with a certain school and post school
education and the shares of women, Germans, trainees, part-time workers, skilled and
unskilled blue and white collar workers respectively.
There are three possible sources of variation in the crime rates that can be used to
identify τ: First, if ﬁrms continuously adjust wages to variations in the crime levels over
time to preserve the (potential) compensating wage diﬀerential, we would expect that wages
within worker/ﬁrm matches vary with crime levels. This, however, seems unlikely as wages
are both downward rigid and, at least in the short run, rather ﬁxed within matches due to
collective bargaining agreements.
Second, workers may change between ﬁrms within counties. As this leads to a new
labor contract with new remuneration, wages could be adjusted to the crime rates. Note,
however, that it seems somewhat unlikely that a worker who switches jobs within a county
would accept a lower paying job just because of a change in the crime rate. Additionally,
we might expect that ﬁrms in the same county ceteris paribus pay similar markups to the
agreed wages.
3While estimation of these three-way error-component (or three-way ﬁxed-eﬀects) models is computa-
tionally non trivial for datasets of the size used in this paper (see Andrews, Schank and Upward 2006),
estimation was possible using the Stata ado-ﬁle felsdvreg by Thomas Cornelissen (see Cornelissen 2006,
2008 for a description).
6Finally, workers may change between counties. Here, it seems possible that regional
diﬀerences in crime rates transform into regional markup payments to the agreed wages and
that workers take regional diﬀerences in the quality of living into account when evaluating
the utility associated with a new job.
For the last two alternatives, note that (voluntary) job changes are often accompanied
by wage increases. However, as not all workers change from a low to a high crime county,
we would expect these increases to be lower (or even negative) for a switch from a high to
a low crime county and higher for a switch from a low to a high crime county. Similarly,
these increases should be higher when the switch occurs in a year with a relatively high
crime rate and lower in years with a low crime rate which enables us to separate the crime
eﬀects from the county speciﬁc eﬀects φj.
There are two problems commonly associated with crime data: First, due to the fact
that the crime statistics in Germany are recorded by the authorities of the Länder, there is
no guarantee that the ﬁgures are completely comparable across counties. Note, however,
that, as far as these diﬀerences are constant over the observation period, this problem
is minimized by the presence of the county speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects φj. These also capture
several other aspects of the respective county that would give rise to a compensating wage
diﬀerential and might be correlated with criminal activities. Additionally, as the main
source of variation in crime rates on the person level is due to persons changing between
counties, it seems likely that these switchers observe true crimes rates in their (potential)
new residence only imperfectly and thus have to rely on the published statistics when
assessing the utility associated with accepting a speciﬁc job/location-combination.
Second, as far as (aggregate) wage levels are related to aggregate crime rates, there
might be an endogeneity problem present. Consider for example a random shock that leads
to lower aggregate wages. If this type of economic deprecation causes more individuals to
engage in criminal activities, we would expect a downwards bias in the estimate for τ in
equation (1). Without further adjusting for this potential endogeneity, the estimate for τ
can be interpreted as a lower bound for the eﬀect of interest.
Note that the fact that crimes may be committed by individuals other than the local
residents does not cause problems in the context of this paper. This fact leads to diﬃculties
when trying to establish the causal relationship between local economic conditions and local
7crime rates as, e.g., local job opportunities aﬀect residents and non-residents diﬀerently.
However, the causes of a high local crime rate should be less relevant for an individual
thinking about accepting a job in a region than the chance of being victimized. Put
diﬀerently, it seems plausible to assume that the disutility of being victimized does not
depend on the place of residence of the respective perpetrator which should make potential
victims indiﬀerent between situations where a high crime rate is caused by locals and a
situation where a high crime rate is caused by visitors to the county.
4 Results
Consider the estimation results for the parameter of interest displayed in table 3. Full
estimation results using the place of work for the regional information can be found in
tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. The coeﬃcients for the control variables in the estimations
using place of living are practically identical. Additionally, all control variables have the
expected inﬂuence on the outcome and do not vary much when using diﬀerent crime rates.
(Table 3 about here.)
Consider ﬁrst the results for men displayed in the top panel of table 3. For property
crimes and the general crime rate we obtain negative results that are also weakly signiﬁcant
when looking at the general crime rate at the place of work. The crime rate for violent
crimes, however, is associated with a larger and highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on log
wages.
Before we discuss the economic importance of these results, consider the results for
females displayed in the lower panel of the table. Here, we obtain signiﬁcant, negative
results for general crime levels for both place of work and place of living as well as weakly
signiﬁcant, negative results for the level of property crimes at the place of work. Similar to
men, we also observe a larger, signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of violent crimes on wage levels.
A central question that arises is if these results may be caused by contemporaneous
endogeneity. Note that we can rule out endogeneity caused by omitted time constant vari-
ables due to the person- and regional-level ﬁxed eﬀects. As already noted in the preceding
section, a potential problem might arise if unobserved wage shocks are related to criminal
8activity. However, for such shocks to explain the results obtained in the estimations, we
would need an unobserved shock that is (a) negatively correlated with wages, (b) positively
correlated with both general and property crimes and (c) negatively correlated with violent
crimes. As it is diﬃcult to imagine any random shock that causes general and property
crime to rise while at the same time decreasing violent crime and wages, contemporaneous
endogeneity does not seem to be responsible for the results.
Note that while the coeﬃcients look negligibly small at a ﬁrst glance, they measure the
impact of a one unit increase in the crime rate which is equivalent to one additional crime
per 100,000 inhabitants. To asses the economic importance of the eﬀects, we therefore
conduct three simulation experiments, whose results are summarized in table 4.
(Table 4 about here.)
First, we take the crime rate as a crude proxy for the chance of an inhabitant or an
individual working in the respective county to become victimized. Increasing this risk by
one percentage point is equal to increasing the crime rate by 1,000. Focusing ﬁrst on men,
this change in crime rates leads to changes in log wages by -0.0004 (general crime rate),
0.016 (violent crime) and -0.001 (property crime) when using the crime rates at the place of
work and by -0.0004 (general crime rate), 0.011 (violent crime) and -0.001 (property crime)
when using the crime rates at the place of living. For women, the corresponding eﬀects
would be changes in log wages by -0.001 (general crime), 0.013 (violent crime) and -0.003
(property crimes) using crime at the place of work and -0.001 (general crime), 0.16 (violent
crime) and -0.002 (property crime) using the place of living. While the eﬀects for the
general crime rate and the property crime rate are in fact negligible, the results for violent
crimes suggest that the a 1% increase in the risk of falling victim to a violent criminal
incident is rewarded by an 1.1% to 1.6% increase in wages which cannot be considered
small from an economic point of view.
As a second simulation exercise, we consider the most extreme change in crime rates
that could possibly be observed in the sample, that is the move from the county with the
lowest to the county with the highest crime rate. For general crime this means moving
from the Landkreis Grafschaft Bentheim in 2004 to Frankfurt (Oder) in 2003 or moving
from 59.3 reported criminal incidents per inhabitant to 19,195.0. For the sake of exposition
9and as it would only results in a change of signs, we ignore the fact that the only logically
possible move would be in the opposite direction due to the temporal ordering of these two
data points. For violent crimes, the move is equivalent to moving again from the Landkreis
Grafschaft Bentheim in 2004 to the city of Neumünster in 2005 or from a crime rate of 90.0
to one of 1,727.0. Finally, for property delicts, the relevant move would be from Landkreis
Grafschaft Bentheim in 2004 to the city of Koblenz in 2003 or from 55.5 to 4,613.0 in the
crime rate. For men, the resulting wage changes would be -0.008 (general crime), 0.026
(violent crime) and -0.046 (property crime) using the place of work and -0.008 (general
crime), 0.018 (violent crime) and -0.046 (property crime) for the place of living. Note that
the relatively high results for property crimes are insigniﬁcant on all conventional levels.
For women, the corresponding results are -0.019 (general crime), 0.021 (violent crime) and
-0.014 (property crime) using crime at the place of work and -0.019 (general crime), 0.028
(violent crime) and -0.009 for the place of living.
Finally, as the previous results use only two (rather extreme) data points, we also
consider increases in crime levels by one standard deviation as a measure for changes in
the crime rate actually observed in the sample. The detailed values for the standard
deviations can be found in tables 1 and 2. Again starting with the male results, a one
standard deviation increase in the respective crime rate leads to changes in log wages by -
0.001 (general crime), 0.004 (violent crime) and -0.0008 (property crime) using crime at the
place of work and to changes by -0.001 (general crime), 0.003 (violent crime) and -0.0007
(property crime). For women, the corresponding results are -0.004 (general crime), 0.004
(violent crime) and -0.002 (property crime) using information for the place of work and
-0.004 (general crime), 0.004 (violent crime) and -0.001 (property crime) using information
for the place of living.
Taken together these results suggest that there seems to be a mark up payment for
high regional crime levels which is consistent with the previous evidence on this matter
summarized in section 1. This eﬀect is larger for violent crimes and smaller and even
negative for general crime levels and property crimes. As one might expect that the
disutility associated with being victim of a criminal incident involving violence is larger
than for being the victim of a property crime, this result is consistent with the existence of a
compensating wage diﬀerential. Simulations suggest that an increase in the (approximate)
probability of being victim of a violent crime by one percentage point increases wages by
10about 1.1% to 1.6% with only marginal wage changes being found for similar increases in
property or general crime levels. Similar results can be observed when considering changes
from the minimum to the maximum of the respective crime rate found in the sample.
Looking at a one standard deviation increase in the crime rates observed in the sample,
however, reveals that the tyical variation in crime rates observed in the sample causes
only marginal changes in wages. In other words, while ﬁrms seem to willing to pay non-
negligible mark ups when workers are forced to work in high-crime ares, the tyical variation
in crime rates observed in the sample suggests that there are relatively few individuals who
actually move between high- and low-crime counties and proﬁt from these mark ups.
5 Conclusion
This paper considered the question whether there is a compensating wage diﬀerential for
having to work in areas characterized by a high crime rate in Germany. Our contributions
are threefold: First, we provide ﬁrst evidence on the relationship between crime rates and
wages for labor markets outside the U.S.. Second, we are the ﬁrst to consider violent and
non-violent crimes separately. Finally, we make a methodological contribution by using
for the ﬁrst time three-way error-component estimators for panel data to control for both
individual- and county-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. Using data from social security
records merged with oﬃcial crime data, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive and non-negligible
impact of violent crimes on wages while the general nd property crime rates inﬂuence wages
to a lesser degree.
Results from several simulations suggest that an approximate 1% increase in the chance
of falling victim to a violent crime increases wages by 1.1% to 1.6% with an even larger
increase being found for the change in crime rates associated with a move from the county
with the lowest to the county with the highest crime rate. For men, the results for other
types of crimes are generally either insigniﬁcant, economically negligible or both. For
women, we ﬁnd a non-negligible decrease in wages associated with large changes in the
general crime rates associated with a move from the lowest to the highest observed crime
rate. Looking at a one stadard deviation increase in crimes rates as a measure of typical
variation in crime rates observed in the sample, we ﬁnd that the wage eﬀects of criminal
activities are rather small for most individuals in the data.
11These results are largely consistent with the previous evidence on this subject summa-
rized in the introduction. On a more practical level, they suggest that, while ﬁrms seem
to be willing to reward the risk of victimization, the wage eﬀects for most individuals are
rather small due to small variation in the crime rates.
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13Table 1: Descriptive statistics, male sample
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum
Real monthly wage (e, 2000 Prices) 2808.0820 1051.4280 663.0336 4813.3970
Log(wage) 7.8655 0.3978 6.4968 8.4792
Age (years) 40.4961 8.0601 25.0000 55.0000
Age (squared) 1704.8970 653.0592 625.0000 3025.0000
Plantsize 1325.8790 5102.7280 1.0000 54162.0000
Share of women 0.2883 0.2181 0.0000 0.9904
Age structure: Share of workers below 20 years 0.0336 0.0522 0.0000 0.8095
Age structure: Share of workers 20-24 years 0.0710 0.0699 0.0000 0.9020
Age structure: Share of workers 25-29 years 0.0934 0.0840 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 30-34 years 0.1147 0.0810 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 35-39 years 0.1573 0.0867 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 40-44 years 0.1624 0.0840 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 45-49 years 0.1361 0.0808 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 50-54 years 0.1112 0.0787 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 54-59 years 0.0753 0.0625 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 60-64 years 0.0329 0.0408 0.0000 0.8000
Age structure: Share of workers above 65 years 0.0122 0.0350 0.0000 0.8333
Share of Germans 0.9316 0.1030 0.0000 1.0000
Share of trainees 0.0483 0.0678 0.0000 0.9919
Share of unskilled blue collar workers 0.1977 0.2390 0.0000 1.0000
Share of skilled blue collar workers 0.2303 0.2452 0.0000 1.0000
Share of white collar workers 0.3742 0.2844 0.0000 1.0000
Share of part-time workers below 18hrs/week 0.0700 0.1202 0.0000 0.9947
Share of part-time workers 18 or more hrs/week 0.0627 0.0980 0.0000 0.9741
Share of unskilled workers with lower secondary schooling 0.1676 0.1846 0.0000 1.0000
Share of skilled workers with lower secondary schooling 0.6508 0.2363 0.0000 1.0000
Share of unskilled workers with higher secondary schooling 0.0217 0.0567 0.0000 1.0000
Share of skilled workers with higher secondary schooling 0.0483 0.0860 0.0000 1.0000
Share of workers with college degree 0.0454 0.0803 0.0000 1.0000
Share of workers with university degree 0.0662 0.1331 0.0000 1.0000
Share of workers with German Mini-jobs 0.0679 0.1249 0.0000 0.9892
Overall crime rate (place of work) 8257.1846 3664.1699 59.3000 19195.0000
Overall crime rate (place of living) 7465.2900 3361.4231 59.3000 19195.0000
Crime rate violent crime (place of work) 636.5988 268.7635 90.0000 1727.0000
Crime rate violent crime (place of living) 586.9421 250.3001 90.0000 1727.0000
Crime rate property delicts (place of work) 1585.9930 752.6227 55.5000 4613.0000
Crime rate property delicts (place of living) 1455.9490 702.9579 55.5000 4613.0000
No. of Obs. 782,279
No. of Individuals 241,715
Crime rates are deﬁned as reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
14Table 2: Descriptive statistics, female sample
Variable Mean Std.Dev Minimum Maximum
Real monthly wage (e, 2000 Prices) 2170.1870 970.3892 317.8928 4813.3970
Log(wage) 7.5707 0.4989 5.7617 8.4792
Age (years) 39.8194 8.6215 25.0000 55.0000
Age (squared) 1659.9139 688.7943 625.0000 3025.0000
Plantsize 667.3875 2772.0210 1.0000 54162.0000
Share of women 0.6208 0.2551 0.0048 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers below 20 years 0.0351 0.0611 0.0000 0.8640
Age structure: Share of workers 20-24 years 0.0793 0.0824 0.0000 0.8929
Age structure: Share of workers 25-29 years 0.1038 0.0984 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 30-34 years 0.1146 0.0910 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 35-39 years 0.1475 0.0975 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 40-44 years 0.1546 0.0977 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 45-49 years 0.1337 0.0959 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 50-54 years 0.1120 0.0925 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 54-59 years 0.0728 0.0695 0.0000 1.0000
Age structure: Share of workers 60-64 years 0.0325 0.0447 0.0000 0.7500
Age structure: Share of workers above 65 years 0.0140 0.0407 0.0000 0.7500
Share of Germans 0.9457 0.0947 0.0000 1.0000
Share of trainees 0.0504 0.0777 0.0000 0.9949
Share of unskilled blue collar workers 0.1245 0.2035 0.0000 1.0000
Share of skilled blue collar workers 0.1018 0.1813 0.0000 1.0000
Share of white collar workers 0.4911 0.2846 0.0000 1.0000
Share of part-time workers below 18hrs/week 0.1086 0.1531 0.0000 0.9904
Share of part-time workers 18 or more hrs/week 0.1158 0.1385 0.0000 0.9663
Share of unskilled workers with lower secondary schooling 0.1505 0.1891 0.0000 1.0000
Share of skilled workers with lower secondary schooling 0.6421 0.2507 0.0000 1.0000
Share of unskilled workers with higher secondary schooling 0.0261 0.0672 0.0000 1.0000
Share of skilled workers with higher secondary schooling 0.0623 0.1083 0.0000 1.0000
Share of workers with college degree 0.0385 0.0803 0.0000 1.0000
Share of workers with university degree 0.0804 0.1495 0.0000 1.0000
Share of workers with German Mini-jobs 0.1046 0.1602 0.0000 0.9892
Overall crime rate (place of work) 8684.9033 3794.2771 59.3000 19195.0000
Overall crime rate (place of livng) 7923.4351 3576.6580 59.3000 19195.0000
Crime rate violent crime (place of work) 659.2164 276.9210 90.0000 1727.0000
Crime rate violent crime (place of living) 611.8324 265.0846 90.0000 1727.0000
Crime rate property delicts (place of work) 1661.2531 772.3702 55.5000 4613.0000
Crime rate property delicts (place of living) 1538.6851 735.1871 55.5000 4613.0000
No. of Obs. 436,603
No. of Individuals 147,926













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Table 5: Wage regressions, male sample, regional information uses place
of work
All crime Violent crime Property crime
Age (years) 0.041644*** 0.041205*** 0.041648***
0.000817 0.000820 0.000817
Age (squared) -0.000528*** -0.000528*** -0.000528***
0.000009 0.000009 0.000009
Plantsize 0.000001*** 0.000001*** 0.000001***
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Share of women -0.019666*** -0.019785*** -0.019669***
0.005326 0.005325 0.005325
Age structure: Share of workers below 20 years -0.016355 -0.016347 -0.016391
0.012081 0.012082 0.012081
Age structure: Share of workers 20-24 years -0.052027*** -0.052004*** -0.052060***
0.009770 0.009770 0.009770
Age structure: Share of workers 25-29 years -0.063726*** -0.063608*** -0.063725***
0.009376 0.009375 0.009375
Age structure: Share of workers 30-34 years -0.035454*** -0.035402*** -0.035451***
0.009040 0.009041 0.009040
Age structure: Share of workers 35-39 years -0.032242*** -0.032358*** -0.032262***
0.008805 0.008805 0.008805
Age structure: Share of workers 40-44 years -0.025795*** -0.025974*** -0.025817***
0.008773 0.008773 0.008773
Age structure: Share of workers 45-49 years -0.032912*** -0.032995*** -0.032938***
0.008827 0.008827 0.008827
Age structure: Share of workers 50-54 years -0.023804*** -0.023709*** -0.023817***
0.008839 0.008840 0.008839
Age structure: Share of workers 54-59 years -0.010898 -0.010463 -0.010886
0.008385 0.008387 0.008385
Age structure: Share of workers above 65 years 0.003095 0.003257 0.003087
0.012447 0.012447 0.012447
Share of Germans 0.002042 0.002059 0.002031
0.008632 0.008633 0.008632
Share of trainees -0.014833 -0.014746 -0.014862
0.016866 0.016864 0.016866
Share of unskilled blue collar workers -0.048728*** -0.048618*** -0.048759***
0.014093 0.014090 0.014093
Share of skilled blue collar workers -0.028506** -0.028471** -0.028545**
0.013941 0.013938 0.013940
Share of white collar workers 0.009715 0.009771 0.009656
0.014115 0.014112 0.014114
Share of part-time workers below 18hrs/week 0.005007 0.005009 0.004961
0.016029 0.016026 0.016029
Share of part-time workers 18 or more hrs/week 0.019466 0.019511 0.019444
0.015779 0.015777 0.015779
Share of unskilled workers with lower secondary schooling -0.023325** -0.023157** -0.023285**
0.010692 0.010694 0.010692
Share of skilled workers with lower secondary schooling -0.007739 -0.007576 -0.007704
0.010385 0.010387 0.010385
Share of skilled workers with higher secondary schooling -0.010530 -0.010587 -0.010507
0.012526 0.012526 0.012526
Share of workers with college degree 0.036662*** 0.03674***9 0.036719***
0.012959 0.012960 0.012959
Share of workers with university degree -0.003515 -0.003426 -0.003470
0.012393 0.012394 0.012394
Share of workers with German Mini-jobs -0.085560*** -0.085485*** -0.085561***
0.008519 0.008520 0.008519
Crime rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) -0.000000* 0.000016*** -0.000001
0.000000 0.000003 0.000001
Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects (3 digit) (included) (included) (included)
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects (3 digit) (included) (included) (included)
Person ﬁxed eﬀects (included) (included) (included)
Region ﬁxed eﬀects (Kreise) (included) (included) (included)
Time ﬁxed eﬀects (years) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Obs. 782,279
No. of Individuals 241,715
No. of Movers between regions 25,883
Coeﬃcients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the person level below. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance
on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Coeﬃcients of control variables using place of work were
practically identical.
18Table 6: Wage regressions, female sample, regional information uses place
of work
All crime Violent crime Property crime
Age (years) 0.011617*** 0.011260*** 0.011627***
0.001619 0.001620 0.001618
Age (squared) -0.000241*** -0.000239*** -0.000240***
0.000018 0.000018 0.000018
Plantsize 0.000002** 0.000002** 0.000002**
0.000001 0.000001 0.000001
Share of women -0.102437*** -0.102432*** -0.102425***
0.009081 0.009080 0.009081
Age structure: Share of workers below 20 years 0.000007 0.000081 0.000063
0.020833 0.020832 0.020832
Age structure: Share of workers 20-24 years -0.033902* -0.033835* -0.033929*
0.018321 0.018321 0.018322
Age structure: Share of workers 25-29 years -0.033633* -0.033551* -0.033609*
0.017874 0.017874 0.017874
Age structure: Share of workers 30-34 years -0.041830** -0.041733** -0.041779**
0.017370 0.017369 0.017370
Age structure: Share of workers 35-39 years -0.028134 -0.028180 -0.028148
0.017210 0.017208 0.017210
Age structure: Share of workers 40-44 years -0.026172 -0.026231 -0.026179
0.017340 0.017338 0.017339
Age structure: Share of workers 45-49 years -0.021031 -0.021079 -0.021100
0.017267 0.017265 0.017267
Age structure: Share of workers 50-54 years -0.028998* -0.028877* -0.029015*
0.017512 0.017512 0.017513
Age structure: Share of workers 54-59 years -0.026130 -0.025859 -0.026079
0.016548 0.016548 0.016548
Age structure: Share of workers above 65 years -0.057621** -0.057614** -0.057638**
0.022599 0.022593 0.022597
Share of Germans 0.005784 0.005748 0.005743
0.014519 0.014517 0.014519
Share of trainees -0.037582 -0.037363 -0.037470
0.038882 0.038904 0.038900
Share of unskilled blue collar workers -0.065042* -0.064874* -0.064944*
0.037016 0.037039 0.037034
Share of skilled blue collar workers -0.056586 -0.056396 -0.056517
0.036767 0.036792 0.036787
Share of white collar workers -0.014963 -0.014898 -0.014952
0.036271 0.036296 0.036291
Share of part-time workers below 18hrs/week 0.021534 0.021627 0.021566
0.037217 0.037242 0.037236
Share of part-time workers 18 or more hrs/week 0.049077 0.049411 0.049231
0.037300 0.037325 0.037319
Share of unskilled workers with lower secondary schooling -0.058190*** -0.058343*** -0.058217***
0.017481 0.017479 0.017478
Share of skilled workers with lower secondary schooling -0.065286*** -0.065399*** -0.065296***
0.016275 0.016272 0.016271
Share of skilled workers with higher secondary schooling -0.073187*** -0.073364*** -0.073231***
0.023642 0.023640 0.023641
Share of workers with college degree -0.026324 -0.026578 -0.026345
0.019772 0.019770 0.019769
Share of workers with university degee -0.014874 -0.015017 -0.014836
0.019685 0.019683 0.019683
Share of workers with German Mini-jobs -0.089821*** -0.089876*** -0.089868***
0.012551 0.012551 0.012551
Crime rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) -0.000001** 0.000013** -0.000003*
0.000001 0.000006 0.000002
Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects (3 digit) (included) (included) (included)
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects (3 digit) (included) (included) (included)
Person ﬁxed eﬀects (included) (included) (included)
Region ﬁxed eﬀects (Kreise) (included) (included) (included)
Time ﬁxed eﬀects (years) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Obs. 436,603
No. of Individuals 147,926
No. of Movers between regions 10,470
Coeﬃcients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the person level below. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance
on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Coeﬃcients of control variables using place of work were
practically identical.
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